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Abstract 
 
The recent rise of the far-right in Europe has been manifested in different fields 
that create crucial challenges for maintaining peace and stability in Europe. The 
first, concerns the increasing votes for far-right parties in various local, national 
and European Parliament elections. Secondly, there has been rise in far-right 
organizations and far-right violence. Thirdly, there has been normalization of far-
right discourse in European politics. This article focuses on different 
manifestations of the rise of the far-right in Germany and Austria and the 
underlying reasons. Specifically, it compares the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) 
and Germany’s National Democratic Party (NPD) in terms of their party 
programs, discourse and electoral success. 
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AVRUPA SİYASETİNDE AŞIRI SAĞIN YÜKSELİŞİNİN FARKLI 
GÖSTERGELERİ: ALMANYA VE AVUSTURYA ÖRNEKLERİ 
 
Öz 
21.yy’da Avrupa’da aşırı sağın yükselişi farklı alanlarda kendini 
göstermektedir, bu süreç, Avrupa’da barışın ve istikrarın korunmasını zorlayan en 
önemli unsurlardandır. İlk olarak, yerel seçimlerde, pek çok ulusal seçimde ve 
Avrupa Parlamentosu seçimlerinde aşırı sağ partilerin yükselen oy oranları, ikinci 
olarak aşırı sağ örgütlerin sayısının ve aşırı sağ şiddet olaylarının artışı olarak 
kendini göstermekte, üçüncü olarak da Avrupa siyasetinde aşırı sağ söylem giderek 
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normalleşmektedir. Bu makalede, Almanya ve Avusturya’da aşırı sağın 
yükselişinin farklı göstergeleri, bunların nedenleri üzerinde durulacak ve bu 
ülkelerde aşırı sağın yükselişinin ve özellikle Avusturya Özgürlük Partisi (FPÖ) ve 
Almanya’daki Ulusal Demokratik Parti (NPD), parti programları, söylemleri ve 
seçimlerdeki başarıları açısından karşılaştırılacaktır. 
Anahtar kelimeler: Aşırı sağ partiler, Avrupa siyaseti, Almanya, Avusturya, 
Avusturya Özgürlük Partisi, Ulusal Demokratik Parti 
 
 
Introduction 
The post-Cold War era has seen a rise in the far-right that has influenced 
European politics. There have also been increases in xenophobia and violence 
against immigrants, especially after September 11, particularly towards Muslim 
immigrants, refugees or those who support policies of multiculturalism.  
The far-right has moved ‘from the margins to the mainstream’ of European 
politics (Mudde, 2013: 2), as manifested in different fields since the turn of the 
century. The first one is the increasing votes for far-right parties in various local, 
national elections and European Parliament (EP) elections. Secondly, there has 
been rise in far-right organizations and far-right violence. Thirdly, there has been 
normalization and mainstreaming of far-right political discourse, which is the most 
dangerous one for the future of Europe because it has allowed the far-right to 
influence the agenda and discourse of mainstream parties, especially those of the 
Christian Democrats. These manifestations create crucial challenges for 
maintaining peace in Europe and continuing the European Union (EU) project. As 
the Oslo killings show, far-right tendencies are not only dangerous for immigrants 
and minorities; but they also threaten all European societies (Fekete, 2012). It is 
thus necessary to deal with the new far-right, not only in terms of electoral politics, 
but also in the other spheres where they have influence (Goodwin et al, 2012: 4).  
Various concepts are used for referring to far-right parties, such as ‘radical 
right’, ‘populist’, ‘extreme-right’, ‘right-wing populist’ and ‘populist radical right’ 
(Mudde, 2007). Mudde (2014: 98-99) uses ‘far-right’ as an umbrella concept 
which includes both the extreme-right and populist radical-right. The ‘extreme-
right’ rejects democracy altogether, while radical-right accepts democracy but 
rejects liberal democracy, which includes pluralism and minority rights. 
Prototypical populist radical-right parties include Front National (FN) in France, 
Danish People’s Party (DF) and Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV). The prototypical 
extreme-right party is Golden Dawn (CA) in Greece. In this article, the term ‘far 
right’ is used, particularly in order to compare one extreme-right party with other 
extreme-right groups in Germany and the populist radical-right in Austria. 
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Far-right parties are represented in the national parliaments of nearly half of 17 
West European countries. However, since 1980, more than 200 national 
governments have been formed in Western Europe but only eight of them included 
a far-right party, all of which were a junior partner in the coalition. Only three 
West European countries have ever had a majority government with the 
participation of a far-right party, although the Netherlands and Denmark had 
minority governments with their support (Mudde, 2013: 3-4). In the last EP 
elections in May 2014, far-right parties increased their number to 86 MEPs, 
constituting 11.45% of the EP. The FN got 25% of the vote in France while the UK 
Independence Party (UKIP) got 27.5% in the UK (European Movement 
International, 2014). 
The normalization and mainstreaming of far-right discourse of populist rhetoric 
is coupled with their increasing electoral success. As Hainsworth (2000: 14) 
argues, far-right parties have influenced the ‘agendas, policies and discourse of 
major political parties and governments’, drawing especially far-right and centre-
right parties closer to each other. 
This article will first analyse various manifestations of the far-right’s rise in 
European politics, primarily by focusing on the rise of various types of far-right 
parties, evaluating their ‘others’, their discourse about the EU, and their influence 
in European politics. Secondly, it will account for the rise of far-right organisations 
and extreme right violence against immigrants, before discussing the 
mainstreaming of far-right discourse and policies. Finally, it will compare the cases 
of two EU members, Germany and Austria, who have a shared history, similar 
political systems, and the same official language. However, the far-right has 
manifested itself in different ways in these countries. The reasons behind the 
different manifestations of the rise of the far-right in Germany and Austria will be 
compared, with particular reference to Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), which is 
one of the strongest far-right parties in Western Europe, and National Democratic 
Party (NPD) of Germany, which is not represented in Germany’s federal 
parliament. They will be compared in terms of their party programs, discourse and 
level of electoral success. 
1. Different Manifestations of the Rising Influence of the Far-Right in 
European Politics 
The primary indicator of the rise of the far-right in European politics is the rise 
of far-right parties, primarily in local elections, but also in some national and EP 
elections. Although the new far-right parties emerged in Western Europe in the 
1970s, their influence did not increase until the 1980s (Hainsworth, 2008). Mudde 
(2013: 4-15) argues that, populist radical right parties constitute the most 
successful new European party family since the end of the Second World War.  
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France’s FN, founded in 1972 as a collection of far-right groups, made its electoral 
breakthrough in the mid-1980s, since when it has become the leading example for 
most contemporary far-right parties in Europe (Goodwin et al, 2012: 25). Many 
have adopted FN propaganda, slogans or even copied its name and logo (Mudde, 
2012: 4). In the late 1990s, Jean Marie Le Pen led attempts to unite the far-right 
across Europe by creating Euro-Nat, an association of European national parties. 
Electoral support for far-right parties increased significantly across Western 
Europe during the 1990s, as rising immigration, unemployment and economic 
stagnation provided a conducive environment for their discourse (Williams, 2006: 
4). Le Pen, for example, won 17% of the votes in the 2002 French Presidential 
elections (Gowland et al, 2006: 427). 
It is necessary to differentiate extremist and populist versions of far-right 
parties. Populist far-right parties are characterised by authoritarianism and 
‘nativism’ which, for Mudde (2007: 294-298), refers to the congruence between a 
state’s population and a native group. He categorises France’s FN and Austria’s 
FPÖ as examples of such populist radical right parties. They are usually against 
pluralist democracy, while promoting ‘traditional’ moral and religious values. 
Although they usually deny any association with racism, they argue that social 
welfare benefits should be restricted to people of the country’s dominant ethnic 
group (Gowland et al, 2006: 428-429). On the other hand, NPD in Germany and 
Golden Dawn in Greece are examples of extreme-right parties with exclusivist 
rhetoric and policies towards immigrants, refugees or minorities. Various countries 
have banned or withheld registration of far-right parties in accordance with anti-
discrimination and anti-extremist legislation. These include the National 
Democratic Party in Austria, the National Socialist Block in the Czech Republic, 
and, Centre Party ‘86 in the Netherlands. In the UK, the Equality and Human 
Rights Commission opened a legal case against British National Party (BNP) 
which forced the party to amend its rules so that it officially accepted non-whites 
as members (Hamilton, 2009). 
In contrast to the fascist parties of the interwar years, today’s far-right parties 
usually accept representative democracy while criticising liberal values (Brandt, 
1996: 26). Due to increasing evidence of mainstream party representatives’ 
involvement in corruption, public trust in them has declined. In this atmosphere, 
far-right parties have become more influential in European politics, as they have 
become more attractive to electorates dissatisfied with mainstream political parties 
(Hainsworth, 2000).  
Some far-right parties have tried to distance themselves from the inter-war 
fascist movements. Currently, many far-right parties, including those in Belgium, 
Austria, France and Italy, do not use autocratic political arguments. Rather than 
abolishing democracy, they seek to transform it into ‘ethnocracy’. Nearly all far-
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right parties share an exclusivist understanding of the ‘nation’ as homogeneous 
(Minkenberg, 2011: 42), using similar slogans, such as the Republikaner’s 
‘Germany for the Germans, foreigners out!’ (Schori Liang, 2007: 10). Such slogans 
reflect their desire to link national affiliation rights to benefit from the welfare state 
to ethnic criteria (Minkenberg, 2011: 42).  
For the new far-right, especially after September 11, immigrants, particularly 
Muslim immigrants, became Western civilisation’s most serious threat, and were 
usually portrayed as the most difficult group to assimilate (Guibernau, 2010: 4-11). 
In recent years, especially in Western Europe, the primary focus of far-right parties 
has been radical Islam, followed by immigration, which they link to security, 
particularly to crime and terrorism. The third issue is the economy, with 
immigration seen as a threat to the wealth and welfare of the nation, and the 
accusation that corrupt elites use immigration for financial and political gain 
(Mudde, 2012, pp. 31-32). 
The electoral success of far-right parties is usually gained locally, as in 
Germany. Such local and regional successes are particularly important for 
achieving long-term success in national elections (Langenbacher & Schellenberg, 
2011: 21). The success of far-right parties does not only depend on the degree of 
extremism in their discourse; but it is also related to other factors, such as 
organisation, leadership and experience of participation in government (Wilson & 
Hainsworth, 2012: 11). According to Mudde (2007: 275-276), successful far-right 
parties, such as FN, are usually characterised by a moderate ideology, a strong 
organization structure and a charismatic leader.  
National election results since the global recession started to influence Europe 
in 2008 indicate that some far-right parties have increased their votes, such as 
Jobbik in Hungary in 2010 and National Alliance in Latvia in 2011. However, the 
EP elections in June 2009 gave no clear indication of increasing far-right electoral 
success. On the one hand, Jobbik got 14.8% in its first EP election, and the British 
National Party and Dutch PVV both increased their votes, by 1.4 and 17 per cent 
respectively. On the other hand, other far-right parties lost votes, such as VB (-
3.4%) and FN (-3.5%). Moreover, in most European countries, far-right parties 
either did not take part in the EP election in 2009 or failed to gain sufficient votes 
to win EP seats, as in Germany, the Czech Republic, Finland and Spain (Mudde, 
2012: 29).  
The recent economic crisis has provided a suitable atmosphere for the 
development of the far-right, with the neo-Nazi Golden Dawn party winning 7% of 
the vote in the Greek general election in May 2012 (Fekete, 2012: 30). Rising 
unemployment has also encouraged the rise of the far-right, although the rise can 
also be observed in more prosperous European countries, such as Denmark and the 
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Netherlands. The far-right’s voters are not only from the working class; they are 
supported also by some well-educated, middle-class voters (Guibernau, 2010). 
Goodwin (2011) argues that, rather than economic concerns, their voters’ main 
motivation is cultural anxiety about the influence of immigration on national 
identity.  
At the last EP elections in 2014, there was a crucial rise in far-right parties. The 
extreme-right Golden Dawn of Greece got 9.38%, FPÖ got 12.71% in the 2009 EP 
elections and 19.70% in the last EP elections. In France, FN, having got 6.3% in 
the previous EP elections, became the first party in France in the last EP elections 
with 24.95% votes.
1
 In addition, as mentioned, the former leader of NPD, Voigt, 
entered the EP in the last EP elections in 2014. 
The far-right parties offer exclusionist policies through constructing the 
dominant ethnic and religious group as ‘us’ and other groups as ‘them’. Increasing 
xenophobia, in terms of fear, prejudice and even aggression towards immigrants, 
has increased the electoral success of far-right parties in Europe. 
Far-right parties usually claim that their native culture is threatened by 
immigrants (Williams, 2010: 113), while also being pessimistic about the 
possibility of integrating them (Fligstein et al, 2012: 116). According to Mudde 
(2007: 66), for far-right parties, the first type of ‘other’ refers to anything outside 
the state and nation, such as the EU. The second type of ‘other’, lies outside the 
state but within the nation. This group includes politicians and intellectuals who 
have emigrated and are accused of corruption. The third type of ‘other’ includes 
those within the state and within the nation, such as the economic and political 
elites, who are characterized as corrupt elements. The last type of ‘other’ refers to 
immigrants, who are within the state but outside the nation.  
Some scholars argue that Muslims, especially immigrant Muslims, have 
replaced Jews as the new transnational ‘other’ in Europe2 (Zuquete, 2008: 329; 
Langenbacher & Schellenberg, 2011: 18), especially after September 11. In a 
speech before France’s 2007 elections, former President of FN, Le Pen, stated that 
Islam in the 21
st
 century is what communism was in the 20
th
 century (cited in 
Poggioli, 2006). FN’s current leader, Marine Le Pen, argues that ‘Europe will no 
longer be Europe. It will turn into an Islamic Republic. We are at a turning point, 
and if we do not protect our civilization it will disappear’ (cited in Amnesty 
International, 2012: 17), while Geert Wilders, leader of Party for Freedom (PVV) 
in the Netherlands, claims that ‘Islam is the biggest threat, threatening our country 
and the entire free Western world’ (cited in Amnesty International, 2012: 17). 
                                                 
1 For further detail, see http://www.results-elections2014.eu/en/election-results-2014.html 
2 For further detail, see D. Boyer (2005) Welcome to the new Europe, American Ethnologist, 32 (4). 
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In the last two decades, political parties promoting an anti-Islamic discourse 
have achieved crucial electoral successes that have even enabled them to enter 
national parliaments and join governing coalitions in several states, such as 
Austria. These parties have instrumentalized public sentiments of anxiety through 
their warnings of the ‘Islamization of Europe’ (Amnesty International, 2012: 15-
16). 
On the other hand, in Eastern Europe, the ‘others’ of the far-right parties 
include minorities, such as Roma or Turks in Bulgaria (Langenbacher & 
Schellenberg, 2011: 18). Anti-Roma discourse is especially common among 
Eastern Europe’s far-right parties, such as National Union Attack (Bulgaria) and 
Jobbik (Hungary), although it has also been intensifying in France and Italy 
(Fekete, 2012: 6-11).  
Europe’s far-right parties favour a cultural understanding of national and 
European identity, usually defining themselves through their national identity. 
Zuquete (2008: 332) argues that the increasing emphasis on a European identity in 
far-right parties is usually associated with the increasing construction of ‘Islam’ as 
the ‘other’ of Europe. Because of the nationalistic elements in their ideology, far-
right parties are against supra-nationalism, considering it as an enemy of the 
nation-state. Especially after the Maastricht Treaty, the EU became perceived by 
far-right parties as signalling a significant loss of national sovereignty. They 
usually see Brussels as corrupt, and controlled by the political and technocratic 
elites. The majority of far-right parties therefore reject the idea of a federal Europe, 
claiming that it will lead to a multicultural Europe in which national identities will 
be eroded (Schori Liang, 2007: 11-13). Far-right parties have successfully engaged 
young people and workers in politics (Goodwin et al, 2012: 19) with their main 
supporters being those who are strongly attached to their national identities, and 
who may be the losers or at least the ones not benefiting from the EU project 
(Fligstein et al, 2012: 114). 
Far-right parties are mostly Eurosceptic or, in many cases, anti-EU (Mudde, 
2007: 162). Some are ‘hard Eurosceptic’, meaning that they are totally against the 
European integration project, even favouring their country’s withdrawal from the 
EU. Those that are ‘soft Eurosceptic’ criticize certain aspects of the EU 
(Vasilopoulou, 2011: 224-225), being more in favour of intergovernmental 
cooperation in the EU. 
Far-right parties are mostly against Turkey’s EU membership. As Delanty 
(2008: 681) argues, Turkey’s bid for EU membership is controversial because of 
fears that it will lead to a new influx of immigrants and result in the Islamification 
of Europe (although this disregards the secular character of Turkey’s constitution). 
A number of far-right leaders have made statements along these lines. Le Pen 
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claimed that Turkey’s possible membership signalled the ‘true Islamic invasion of 
Europe’ (cited in Zuquete, 2008: 331), while Christoph Blocher, leader of the 
Swiss People’s Party, stated that ‘we had the Turks at the gates of Vienna once, we 
do not need that again’ (cited in Schulz, 2011: 31). In short, rejection of Turkey’s 
EU membership bid is a common discourse of far-right parties, especially in 
Western Europe. This also usually influences the discourse of centre-right parties. 
In 2005, representatives from seven far-right parties
3
 prepared the Vienna 
Declaration of Patriotic and National Movements and Parties in Europe, calling for 
a rejection of EU enlargement to non-European regions, an immediate stop to 
immigration, restriction of social benefits to immigrants and rejection of the 
Constitutional Treaty (Fligstein et al, 2012: 115). Having agreed to meet annually 
and establish a ‘Contact Forum for European Patriotic and National Parties and 
Movements’, they established an office in Vienna (cited in Schori Liang, 2007: 13-
14). 
There has thus been increasing interaction and cooperation between far-right 
movements and political parties in Europe, although they have found it harder than 
other political groups to establish a transnational federation. One of the main 
unifying factors is ‘anti-Islamism’. For example, Pro Cologne participated in a 
European network called ‘Cities against Islamisation’ that includes FPÖ and 
Vlaams Belang (VB) from Belgium. Important figures from far-right parties across 
Europe came to Cologne for anti-Islam conferences in 2008 and 2009 
(Schellenberg, 2011: 78).  
At the EP level, far-right groups have formed two political parties. The first is 
the Identity, Tradition and Sovereignty Group (ITS), which includes members of 
FN, VB,  Bulgarian Ataka and Greater Romania Party (PRM); the other party is the 
conservative Union for Europe of the Nations (UEN), which includes Liga Nord 
and Dansk Folkeparti (DFP) (Fligstein et al, 2012: 115). ITS was established after 
the accession of Romania and Bulgaria to the EU in 2007. To monitor the activities 
of this party at the EP, the socialist parties established the ‘Extreme Right Watch 
Group’. Ironically, the far-right EP group collapsed within its first year because its 
Deputy Chairperson, Alexandra Mussolini, refused to accept PRM’s complaint that 
Romanians in Italy were being treated as if they were all Roma (Schulz, 2011: 34). 
In 2009, Alliance of European National Movements was formed by Jobbik, FN, 
Belgium’s National Front, Sweden’s National Democrats and Italy’s Tricolour 
                                                 
3 The representatives who participated in the preparation of Vienna Declaration of 2005 were from FPÖ, 
VB, Ataka, FN, Italian Azione Sociale and Movimiento Sociale-Fiamma Tricolore (MS-FT), Romanian 
PRM and Spanish Alternativa Espanola. 
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Flame (Goodwin et al, 2012: 18).
4
 In the last EP elections, most members of the 
European Parliament (MEPs) from far-right parties became part of the ‘non-
inscrits’, who are unattached to any political group at the EP. 
One important factor facilitating the increase in cooperation among far-right 
parties is the Internet as far-right parties usually have well-designed websites and 
use social media effectively (Goodwin et al., 2012: 3). Thus, there has been 
increasing transnational cooperation among far-right parties in Europe. However, 
because of variations among their approaches and their nationalist concerns, far-
right transnational cooperation has not usually been sustainable. 
The second manifestation of the rise of Europe’s far-right is the growth in far-
right organizations and far-right violence. The 1990s saw significant incidents of 
extreme-right violence in Germany, Scandinavia and certain Central and Eastern 
European countries. However, the correlation between the strength of far-right 
parties and extreme-right violence is unclear because there is a lack of reliable 
cross-national data on extreme-right violence, as most countries lack a central 
agency to collect such information (Mudde, 2012: 23).  
Violent right-wing extremism involves a wide range of people, including 
members of far-right parties but also individuals who engage in violent activity. 
Similarly, while far-right social movements, trying to mobilise public support for 
their cause, do not usually involve themselves in violence, they may still become a 
home for violent individuals. Finally, there are so-called ‘lone wolves’ like the 
extreme-right Norwegian mass-murderer, Anders Breivik, without any formal links 
to established groups (Goodwin et al, 2012: 6). Breivik’s extreme-right terrorist 
attack in 2011 put the spotlight on extreme-right terrorism, leading to several 
critiques that claimed the attack could have been prevented if European states had 
given more attention to extreme-right terrorists rather than just focusing on Islamist 
terrorists (Mudde, 2012: 23), as has been the case in the past decade, as Western 
states mainly concentrated on fighting al-Qaeda or ‘AQ-inspired terrorism’ 
(Goodwin et al, 2012: 38). 
The third manifestation of the rise of far-right in European politics is that far-
right parties have influenced the styles of leadership and discourse of mainstream 
parties (Goodwin et al, 2012: 19), bringing the two groups closer to each other. 
The main influences of the far-right parties on mainstream parties are their anti-
immigration discourse and being against Turkey’s EU membership (Mudde, 1999).  
Thus, the level of support for far-right parties in local, national and European 
elections, their coalition-building with centre-right parties, and their influence on 
                                                 
4 At the end of 2011, Marine Le Pen resigned from this group and joined the more moderate European 
Alliance for Freedom. 
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the discourse and policies of mainstream parties all show their increasing influence 
in European politics. While no far-right party has achieved a ruling majority in any 
national parliamentary election in Europe yet, as mentioned, they have been part of 
coalition governments with centre-right parties (Fligstein et al, 2012: 115).  
One of the effects of the rise of far-right parties in European politics is that they 
have challenged Social Democratic Parties by attracting working-class voters, who 
have traditionally supported the centre-left, which may also facilitate the formation 
of centre-right governments (Bale et al, 2010: 410). This also forces mainstream 
parties to search for a balance between ignoring and cooperating with far-right 
parties (Goodwin et al, 2012: 28). 
Right-wing parties, such as the British Conservative Party, the Dutch People’s 
Party for Freedom and Democracy and the French Union for a Popular Movement, 
have adopted far-right positions more often than left-wing parties. However, there 
are also examples of social democratic and even communist parties that have 
adopted anti-immigration positions, such as the Dutch Labour Party and French 
Communist Party. They have even influenced changes in immigration laws in 
France, Austria, Denmark and the Netherlands (Norris, 2005). 
Consequently, in recent years, the lines between violent and non-violent 
rhetoric, extreme and non-extreme have become blurred, while negative rhetoric 
towards immigrants and minorities has become normalised. These trends may pose 
a threat to pluralistic democracies in Europe (Goodwin et al, 2012: 30). 
Mainstreaming of far-right discourse and policies is one of the biggest challenges 
to peace in Europe in the 21
st
 century. It may provide a more suitable platform for 
the rise of far-right with various manifestations that were mentioned in European 
politics. 
2. The Rise of the Far-Right in Western Europe: The Cases of Germany 
and Austria 
The different manifestations of the rise of the far-right in Western European 
politics can be analysed by comparing the cases of Germany and Austria, who have 
a shared history, similar political systems, the same official language, and who are 
both members of the EU. Austria and Germany both have a high number of 
Turkish immigrants and public opinion in these countries is mostly against 
Turkey’s membership to the EU. Austria and Germany share similar immigration 
histories, as both implemented ‘guest-worker policies’ from the 1960s until 1974, 
when ‘recruitment stops’ were implemented. Since the 1990s, the issue of 
immigration, integration and citizenship has become more important in German 
and Austrian politics. They have similar nationality laws regarding the acquisition 
of citizenship, both relying on the ‘jus sanguinis’ principle, referring to ethnic 
descent, although Austria made some amendments to its nationality law in 1999 
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and Germany in 2000. In Germany, the principle was softened by introducing a 
limited ‘jus soli’ principle5 (Ludvig, 2004: 499-505), meaning that citizenship can 
now be acquired based on birthplace, allowing automatic German citizenship for a 
child born in Germany to foreign parents if at least one of the parents has lived 
legally in Germany for at least eight years and holds a permanent residence permit. 
While Islam is still not recognised as an official religion in Germany (Mudde, 
2007: 84-86), it gained official recognition in Austria in the 19
th
 century and was 
finally given equal status with other religions in 1912. This is a historical legacy of 
the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which included Bosnia and Herzegovina (Schmied 
& Wieshaider, 2004: 202). 
The rise of the far-right in Austria has been reflected in the federal parliament 
election results of two far-right parties, FPÖ and BZÖ, which can be defined as 
‘populist far-right parties’. In Germany, the rise of the far-right has not yet been 
reflected in federal elections. However, it can be seen in local elections in some 
regions of Germany, while their influence can be also seen in the high number of 
far-right organisations and extreme-right violence against immigrants, refugees or 
against those who are perceived as supporters of multicultural policies. Research 
shows that extreme-right violence is not directly related to the presence and 
strength of far-right parties (Mudde, 2012: 31). In Germany, the far-right parties 
have a fragmented and weak structure, although the far-right movements are strong 
(Minkenberg, 2011: 47). In 2010, an annual report found that, while membership 
of far-right parties in Germany had declined, affiliations to non-electoral, neo-Nazi 
groups were on the rise (cited in Goodwin et al, 2012: 40). 
In the following sections, different manifestations of the rise of the far-right in 
Germany and Austria are analysed. Particularly, the reasons behind the different 
manifestations of the rise of far-right in Germany and Austria, and, the party 
programmes and the discourse of FPÖ of Austria and NPD of Germany are 
scrutinized in detail. 
3. The Far-Right in Germany: the National Democratic Party (NPD), Far-
Right Movements and Extreme-Right Violence 
After the Second World War, there was only a restricted political space for far-
right parties in Germany because of sensitivities due to the country’s Nazi past. 
Since then, there has also been careful suppression of far-right parties through 
cross-party consensus while maintaining democratic competition (Howard, 2001: 
18). According to Nedelcu and Miller (2011: 62), the far-right in Germany has 
become radicalized by a number of factors: The Christian Democratic Party (CDU) 
has a well-established anti-immigration position and there is restricted political 
                                                 
5 Acquiring German citizenship, retrieved on March 14, 2012, from http://sachsen.de/en/1444.htm  
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space for the far-right. Political, media and public discourse about immigration and 
Islam in Europe, particularly in Germany, have also influenced the level of support 
for the far-right (Williams, 2010: 112).  
Compared to other western European countries, far-right parties in Germany 
have had relatively very little electoral success in federal elections. There are 
several far-right parties in Germany, such as Republicans (REP) and German 
People’s Union (DVU). However, this article will focus on National Democratic 
Party of Germany (NPD) which is the most influential. None have entered the 
Bundestag yet, although REP won 7.1% at the EP elections in 1989. At local and 
regional levels, however, far-right parties have significant strength. NPD, DVU, 
REP, Stop Foreigners action group and Pro-Cologne group all have seats in 
several local assemblies and municipal councils (Schellenberg, 2011: 64).  
NPD was established in 1964, with many members being former Nazis. The 
party’s initial programme included pro-Nazi, anti-Communist and Catholic 
elements. Udo Voigt was the chairman of the party between 1996 and 2011 before 
Holger Apfel took over in 2011 till he was replaced by Udo Pastörs in December 
2013. The new programme of the party was prepared in 1996. It is nationalist, 
populist, favours a form of national socialism, and includes anti-capitalist and 
nationalist revolutionary elements. The party is hostile to the ruling system, and 
propagates a biological understanding of race that favours the expulsion of 
immigrants (Schellenberg, 2011: 58-59). Despite its extreme policies, in 2002, the 
Supreme Court dismissed an attempt by the state to ban NPD. In January 2011, 
DVU merged with NPD. However, Munich Regional Court declared the merger 
null and void. Discussions and attempts to ban NPD continue in Germany. A 
number of other far-right parties in Europe have kept their distance from NPD as it 
is usually perceived as representing an extreme form of the far-right that includes 
La Falange from Spain and Forza Nuova from Italy. 
NPD claims that German culture has been affected by foreign influences since 
the Second World War, arguing that ‘German virtues have been undermined by 
American cultural imperialism and non-European immigrants’ (Williams, 2010: 
114). The party programme lists various threats to the German ‘nation’:  
In the 21st century whether the German nation will survive or abolish will be 
clarified. The sources of threats for its existence are the decline in birth rates, 
quickly spreading alienation, the enforcements of international 
organizations, and the dreadful effects of globalization (NPD Party 
Programme, 2010: 5).  
For NPD, ‘Germans have to choose between to be a social state or to be an 
immigration country’ (NPD Party Programme, 2010: 6). The party programme 
(2010: 11) requires that foreigners should be excluded from the German social 
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security system and placed under a new social security law. According to the 
programme (2010: 12): 
Because of crowds of naturalizations, German citizenship rights are abused 
and even the right of existence of German nation is nearly to be questioned. 
In order to overcome this decay, the previous citizenship system of ‘jus 
sanguinis’ has to come into force again. For NPD, ‘multicultural’ society is 
unsuccessful. In many cities parallel societies and ghettos are emerging, 
thus, German people in these regions have become minorities in their own 
countries.  
The party programme (2010: 5) emphasizes that: 
Germany should stay the country of Germans and when it was not like this it 
has to be returned to this character again. Permanent residence permits 
should not be given to the foreigners in Germany. On the contrary, they have 
to be pushed to return back to their countries… Germany’s alienation on an 
ethnic basis through immigration has to be prevented decisively like cultural 
alienation which is caused by Americanization and Islamization.  
NPD is even against the integration of immigrants. ‘The foreigners, who come 
from different countries for several job opportunities have to protect their 
identities. This will facilitate their return to their countries’ (NPD Party 
Programme, 2010: 13). It perceives international organizations like the EU as a 
threat to the sovereignty of the state and autonomy of the people so it takes a ‘hard 
Eurosceptic’ approach, arguing that ‘national sovereignty means that German state 
sovereignty and independence have to be reconstructed and for this it is necessary 
to leave EU and NATO’ (NPD Party Programme, 2010: 5). The party has an 
exclusivist understanding of European identity.  For NPD, states like Turkey, 
which supposedly have totally different social and cultural structure, cannot be part 
of Europe, and claims that Turkey’s EU membership would trigger increased crime 
(NPD Party Programme for Europe, 2003: 15-20) because of the rise of Turkish 
immigrants after Turkey’s accession to the EU. 
Regarding violence, offences motivated by the extreme-right have increased 
significantly in Germany in recent decades, leading it to have the highest level of 
extreme-right violence among western European countries. In 2002, there were 
10,902 extreme right offences and 19,894 in 2008 (Schellenberg, 2011: 71-72). Die 
Zeit recorded that 137 victims have been killed by racist violence in 20 years since 
Germany was reunited (cited in Schellenberg, 2011: 72). Such violence is more 
common in the east than the west of the country (Brandt, 1996: 36). 
After the attacks on hostels for asylum seekers in Hoyerswerda and Rostock, 
and the racist murders in Solingen and Mölnn, some extreme-right organizations 
were banned, but in response they simply stopped applying for official status, 
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creating instead more flexible associations of 10 to 30 people in a loose network. 
Because of their loose autonomous structure, they can largely escape state 
repression, although a few of these groups were also banned (Schellenberg, 2011: 
68-69). 
Germany’s Office for the Defence of the Constitution regards anti-capitalist 
groups like the ‘Autonomous Nationalists’ and the ‘Free Forces of National 
Resistance’ as a greater threat than NPD. However, there is also an interplay 
between old and new forms of far-right activity in that NPD has become dependent 
on groups like the ‘Autonomous Nationalists’ to mobilise its supporters on the 
streets (Fekete, 2012: 23).  
There have been a growing number of far-right internet sites in Germany, 
which the state has not usually been able to suppress because these groups may 
cooperate with foreign servers, which means their sites are not subject to the legal 
requirements of the German constitution (Schellenberg, 2011: 77-78).  
As a result, the German state has engaged in suppression of far-right parties 
through cross-party consensus while maintaining democratic competition (Howard, 
2001: 18). However, extreme-right attacks are still widespread in Germany. Anti-
Semitism is still crucial for the far-right in Germany. Because of the internal 
problems and state restrictions, far-right parties will find it hard to gain electoral 
success at the national level in the foreseeable future (Schellenberg, 2011: 79). On 
the other hand, the former leader of NPD, Udo Voigt became the first MEP from 
NPD in the last EP elections in 2014. The German Constitutional Court has 
successfully limited the spread of the organized far-right movement (Howard, 
2001: 29). However, this has not been enough to prevent far-right violence in 
Germany, which is much higher than in other Western European countries. 
4. The Far-Right in Austria: The Role of Populist Far-Right Right Parties 
and the Case of the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) 
After the Second World War, mainstream parties in both Germany and Austria 
reached an elite consensus not to cooperate with, or even tolerate the few small far-
right parties and movements that existed in the early post-war period. This 
exclusion meant that they remained marginal in political party systems. However, 
this process took a different form in each country, which led to different 
consequences. In Germany, the elite consensus was enforced by the Constitutional 
Court, through its power to outlaw any political parties or organizations with far-
right views. In Austria, the elite consensus was not implemented by the 
Constitutional Court; rather, the two mainstream parties (Social Democrats and 
People’s Party) cooperated to exclude potential competitors, in what became 
known as the ‘Proporz system’. As long as these parties continued to cooperate, 
this denied opportunities for far-right parties to threaten the democratic system. 
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FPÖ, which was established in 1956 as a continuation of the post-Nazi 
‘Association of Independents’, was thereby excluded by the mainstream parties for 
a long period. However, this changed in the late 1970s, when Social Democrat 
Chancellor Kreisky tried to weaken the People’s Party by helping FPÖ to increase 
its influence. Between 1983 and 1986, the Social Democrats under Vranitzky 
included FPÖ as a junior partner in the coalition government. Then, between 1986 
and 1999, the Social Democrats and the People’s Party formed an ineffective 
‘grand coalition’, which allowed FPÖ to enhance its credibility as the major 
opposition party (Howard, 2001: 22-24). 
In the November 1999 elections, FPÖ won 27% of the votes, becoming a 
partner in the coalition government with the Christian Democrats. In protest at the 
inclusion of Haider’s party in the coalition government, the other 14 member states 
of the EU announced that they would suspend bilateral links with Austria, reduce 
contact with Austrian ambassadors and oppose Austrian candidates for 
international positions. This reaction had symbolic importance in demonstrating 
that far-right parties were against the values of the EU. However, in September 
2000, an EU report convinced other member states to lift diplomatic sanctions 
against Austria as the response had served its purpose (Howard, 2001: 25-31) of 
sending a signal to the Austrians and other Europeans about the EU’s official 
position towards the far-right. 
In 2002, disputes within FPÖ over elections caused the resignation of several 
members, which led to the collapse of the coalition government and Haider’s 
resignation as FPÖ chairman. In the 2002 elections, FPÖ lost more than half of its 
votes, although it still became a coalition partner in the subsequent government. 
FPÖ then split, with the formation of the Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ), 
led by Haider.  
FPÖ perceives immigration and Islamism as challenges to Austrian and 
European identity. For example, in a 2007 press release, Strache, leader of FPÖ, 
claimed that, ‘challenged by globalisation and modern migration, our identity is 
increasingly threatened in the cultural, religious, as well as the political domain’ 
(cited in Strasser, 2008: 183). He worried about the demise of the Occident, 
claiming that ‘we shall end up in a mono-cultural future of Islamism, if we do not 
fight back’ (cited in Strasser, 2008: 183). 
According to an Austrian federal parliamentarian from FPÖ interviewed by the 
author, FPÖ is a nationalist conservative party rather than a far-right party: 
There are three cornerstones that differentiate us from the rest of the political 
spectrum in Austria and from most other parties in Europe. We want to 
preserve the particular identity of the nations of the states and of Europe as a 
whole. […] Second is independence: […] limiting the amount of power we 
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give to the EU. […] we say too much power has already been transferred to 
the EU. […] We should re-nationalize parts of the politics, especially where 
EU has had an obvious failure. For example, the monetary policy is a 
disastrous failure. […] Third […] we do not think it is correct that European 
Court has made the supreme legal decisions for member states.  
(Interviewee, 2012). 
The Interviewee noted various differences with the centre-right party in 
Austria, stating that there are some points on which they agree but there are also a 
lot of subjects on which they do not agree at all. In his view the main point of 
difference is that the People’s Party is in favour of federal Europe, whereas FPÖ is 
in favour of an EU with an intergovernmental structure (Interviewee, 2012). 
According to FPÖ’s party programme (2011), ‘the basic constitutional principles 
of sovereign member states must have absolute priority over Community law’.  
On the other hand, although the FPÖ’s party programme (2011) emphasizes 
that Austria is not a country of immigration, the programme does allow that ‘legal 
and legitimate immigrants, who are already integrated, who can speak German 
language, who fully acknowledge our values and laws and have set down cultural 
roots should be given the right to stay and obtain citizenship’. On the other hand, 
the interviewee from FPÖ (2012) noted a correlation between the level of 
immigration and unemployment, claiming that ‘we must jointly limit immigration. 
[…] We cannot fight against unemployment, particularly youth unemployment, 
without taking into account the problems of immigration’: 
We should limit immigration to the internal needs of the abilities of society 
and labour market to absorb immigration. […] It should be ‘us’ deciding 
whom we allow to immigrate and in what number, and it should not be done 
by misusing the instrument of asylum and illegal immigration. […] It should 
be done in the neighbouring country. […] We should have a very tough line 
on asylum seekers, especially when they pass through twenty other states 
with no crisis and no war, just to apply for asylum in Austria. (Interviewee, 
2012).  
In the 2004 EP elections, concern over Turkey’s EU membership bid lay at the 
core of FPÖ’s campaign, which also influenced the positions of other political 
parties in Austria in that just before the elections, the leading candidates of all 
parties expressed their opposition to Turkey’s EU membership (Bunzl, 2005: 506). 
Regarding EU enlargement, the interviewee from FPÖ (2012) argued: 
For us the limit is the geographical border of Europe. That is why we are 
against Turkey’s membership. We think the maximum we can do is […] the 
Western Balkans. […]Within the next 5 to 15 years I think they will all be 
members of the EU. [It] may take time in the case of Albania, Kosovo. […] 
We must be open in some way towards Ukraine, Moldova, if there is a 
change, towards Belarus. Why do we exclude Turkey? […] The more 
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different cultures you integrate into the EU, the more likely that everything 
will explode. [...] So different models of society, Greek, German, and 
Portuguese - they are already over-integrated and tension is so high and it 
does not work. The more different social models we integrate in that, the 
more difficult it will become.  
In short, he does not perceive Turkey as European, either in geographical or 
cultural terms; thus, he finds Turkey’s integration to the EU the most difficult of all 
the candidates and even other neighbouring countries of the EU. 
The former leader of FPÖ, Haider, also referred to history when talking about 
Turkey’s EU membership: ‘For what reasons did our ancestors defend our country 
against the Turks if we are now letting them in again?’ (cited in Gingrich, 1998: 
104). When Haider was the leader of FPÖ, the party’s main slogan was ‘Turkey 
into the EU? Not with me!’ FPÖ pamphlets claimed: 
Just because 3% of Turkey happens to be in Europe geographically does not 
mean that Turkey is a European state […] Turkey’s state institute for 
statistics forecasts a population of 95 million for the year 2050. The country 
with the highest population in the EU would then be Islamic’ (cited in 
Bunzl, 2005: 505).  
During its campaign for Vienna City Council elections in 2005, FPÖ used 
various discourse against immigration, Turkey, Turks and Muslims. BZÖ was also 
against negotiations with Turkey (Strasser, 2008: 180-181). In the campaigns of 
far-right parties in Austria, Turkey and Turkish immigrants, who are the biggest 
Muslim community in Austria, are presented as an important threat. FPÖ’s leader 
Strache, was portrayed as the new Prince Eugene, who had saved Vienna from the 
Turkish siege of 1683. In 2004, even the Social Democrats, as the opposition party, 
rejected Turkey’s membership bid. This attitude, a sign of the mainstreaming of 
far-right discourse in Austria, can be related to their need to regain the support of 
working class and retired voters, who had become more attracted by far-right 
propaganda that included elements of xenophobia and Islamophobia. During that 
period, both the opposition and its base pushed the Austrian government, which 
included the Christian Democrats (ÖVP) and FPÖ, to prevent the start of accession 
negotiations between Turkey and the EU. In the end, however, the Austrian 
government relented after the decision was taken to start negotiations with Croatia 
at the same time as Turkey in 2005. In response to criticism of this stance, the 
Chancellor of Austria stated that even if Turkey successfully completed the 
negotiations, a referendum would be held over accepting Turkey’s EU 
membership. In the 2006 election campaigns, FPÖ used slogans such as ‘No to a 
Turkish EU’, claiming that Islam and Turkishness are incompatible with Austria 
and Europe (Günay, 2009: 105-109). 
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On 23-24 October 2010 FPÖ was organized a meeting in Vienna to increase 
cooperation between right-wing parties, with Christian Democrat parties being 
particularly influential. The participants decided to start a referendum campaign 
over Turkey’s EU membership bid, with Strache arguing that it would be wrong to 
accept ‘non-European’ countries into the EU because this would represent a 
‘Europe-Asia-Africa Union’.6 
In contrast to NPD, FPÖ’s party programme (2011) emphasizes that they are 
against extremism:  
We are prepared to put up a resolute defence of these European values and 
our basic liberal-democratic order against fanaticism and extremism and to 
take action to maintain and develop our dominant culture and our way of life 
in peace and in freedom.  
As a result, although NPD and FPÖ share some discourse about anti-
immigration and anti-Islamization of Europe and both are against Turkey’s EU 
membership, there are also important differences between them. Firstly, NPD is an 
extreme-right party and cannot gain representation in the federal parliament, 
whereas FPÖ is a populist radical-right party, represented at the federal parliament, 
has closer relations with mainstream parties and has even been part of the federal 
government. Secondly, NPD is anti-EU, whereas FPÖ is soft Eurosceptic and more 
in favour of an intergovernmental EU; NPD has a more restrictive immigration 
policy, even being against giving citizenship for integrated immigrants, unlike FPÖ 
which is not against integrated immigrants.  
Conclusion 
There has been resurgence of far-right politics that has led to a mainstreaming 
of anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim discourse (Goodwin et al, 2012: 3) and far-right 
parties have become more successful electorally. They have learned from their 
mistakes and gained experience at regional and local level. Far-right parties claim 
that centre-right or centre-left governments are all the same and emphasize that an 
alternative is needed (Wilson & Hainsworth, 2012: 15). New far-right parties are 
implementing a new style of politics that relies increasingly on young, educated 
and charismatic leaders to overcome their old reputations. In addition, they use 
new technologies, expert campaigners and try to mobilise across national borders 
(Goodwin et al, 2012: 4). 
The main themes of far-right rhetoric are anti-immigration, usually ‘hard 
Euroscepticism’, anti-Islamism, and emphasising national identity and security. 
Immigration is perceived as a challenge to culture, national identity and European 
                                                 
6For further detail, see www.ikv.org.tr/.../avrupada_asiri_sag_partiler_turkiyenin_ab_uyelig,  Retrieved 
at: March 8, 2012. 
 MARMARA JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN STUDIES                                                        103 
 
identity, the security of the country, and a drain on the welfare system. There is no 
clear relationship between the number of immigrants and extremist violence; 
neither is there a correlation between the electoral strength of far-right parties and 
the level of extremist violence in each country (Mudde, 2012: 31).  
The Eurozone crisis has provided a suitable platform for the rise of far-right 
tendencies, providing a political opportunity structure which has been used by far-
right parties. It therefore seems that they will not disappear in the near future 
because the circumstances out of which they emerged and developed will not 
change soon (Wilson & Hainsworth, 2012: 3-5).  
Although there are some similarities, there are crucial differences between the 
far-right in Germany and Austria. Both of them are against Turkey’s accession to 
the EU. One of the main differences is that far-right parties are not so strong in 
Germany and remain unrepresented in the federal parliament, but the far-right has 
manifested itself with several violent attacks by extreme-right groups while in 
Austria the populist far-right party FPÖ is represented in the federal parliament and 
the violent attacks by extreme-right groups are rare. In both countries, the far-right 
discourse has influenced mainstream parties, especially the Christian Democrats. 
While NPD cannot enter the German federal parliament and it is mostly considered 
as an extreme-right party, FPÖ even joined the coalition government. While NPD 
is even against integrated immigrants, FPÖ accepts the integrated immigrants. 
While NPD is totally against the EU, FPÖ is in favour of an intergovernmental EU.  
On the one hand, the far-right’s rise in European politics should not be 
exaggerated. Media attention on such parties has sometimes been higher than their 
actual level of success (Ellinas, 2010). On the other hand, its significance should 
not be underestimated either (Goodwin et al, 2012: 3). That is, a balanced approach 
is needed towards the rise of far-right in European politics. 
The rise of the far-right across Europe in different forms is one of the main 
challenges to peace in Europe and represents a challenge to the EU project in the 
21
st
 century. A common discourse and consistent policies against far-right groups 
are needed, especially against extreme-right violence in Europe. In particular, the 
EU has to develop consistent policies and develop new measures to fight against 
xenophobia and Islamophobia. At national level, mainstream parties need to be 
more effective and successful, especially in terms of social and economic policies, 
particularly concerning the challenge of rising unemployment rates. In short, a 
coordinated approach is essential towards the rise of far-right among the EU and its 
member states, and within member states, while public authorities and NGOs need 
to work together to fight against the rise of Europe’s far-right.  
 
 104                                                  THE RISE OF FAR-RIGHT IN EUROPEAN POLITICS 
 
References: 
Amnesty International Report, Choice and Prejudice: Discrimination against Muslims in 
Europe, (April 2012), London, pp. 1-123. 
Brandt, P., (1996), “Will Fascism Return? Germany and Europe in the Mid-90s”, Debatte: 
Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe Vol.4, No.1, pp. 21-40. 
Bunzl, M., (2005), “Between anti-Semitism and Islamophobia: Some Thoughts on the New 
Europe”, American Ethnologist, Vol. 32, No.4, pp.499-508.  
Delanty, G., (December 2008), “Fear of  ‘Other’s: Social Exclusion and the European Crisis 
of Solidarity”, Social Policy and Administration, Vol. 42, No. 6, pp.676-690. 
Elections to the German Bundestag, Retrieved at: March 18, 2012,  
http://www.electionresources.org/de/ 
Ellinas, A. A., (2010), The Media and the Far Right in Western Europe: Playing the 
Nationalist Card, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
European Movement International (2014), “European Elections 2014: A First Look Pro-
European Perspective”, Retrieved at: September 27, 2014   
http://europeanmovement.eu/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/EP2014-Analysis.pdf  
Federal Elections in Austria, Retrieved at March 8, 2012, 
http://www.electionresources.org/at/ 
Fekete, L., (2012), “Pedlars of Hate: The Violent Impact of the European Far Right”, 
Institute of Race Relations, London, pp. 1-44. 
Fligstein, N. et al., (2012), “European Integration, Nationalism and European Identity”, 
Journal of Common Market Studies Vol. 50, (S1), pp. 106-122. 
Gingrich, A., (1998), Frontier Myths of Orientalism: The Muslim World in Public and  
Popular Cultures of Central Europe. In: B. Bojan and B. Borut (eds.) 
MediterraneanEthnological Summer School 2, Institute for Multicultural Studies, 
Ljubljana, pp. 99-127. 
Goodwin et al., (February 2012), “The New Radical Right: Violent and Non-Violent 
Movements in Europe”, Institute for Strategic Dialogue, Briefing Paper, London, pp.1-
57. 
Gowland, D. et al., (2006), The European Mosaic, Prentice Hall, London. 
Guibernau, M., (March 2010), “Migration and the Rise of the Radical Right”, Policy 
Network Paper, London, pp. 1-19. 
Günay, C., (2009), Avusturya. In: S. Akşit et al (eds.), Avrupa Birliği Ülkelerinden  
Türkiye’nin Üyeliğine Bakış, Zeplin İletişim, Ankara, pp. 97-112. 
Hainsworth, P., (2008), The Extreme Right in Western Europe, Routledge, New York. 
Hainsworth, P., (2000), Introduction: The Extreme Right. In: P. Hainsworth (ed.), The 
Politics of the Extreme Right: From The Margins to the Mainstream, Pinter Pub., 
London. 
Hamilton, F., (2009, September 3), “British National Party Forced to Admit Non-whites”, 
The Times. 
 MARMARA JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN STUDIES                                                        105 
 
Howard, M. M., (2001), “Can Populism be Suppressed in a Democracy?”, East European 
Politics and Societies, Vol.14, No.2, pp.18-32. 
Interview with a Federal Parliamentarian from FPÖ, (May 15, 2012), conducted by the 
author in Vienna. 
Langenbacher, N. & B. Schellenberg, (2011), Introduction: An Anthology about the 
Manifestations and Development of the Radical Right in Europe. In: N. Langenbacher & 
B. Schellenberg (eds.), Is Europe on the “Right” Path?: Right-wing Extremism and 
Right-wing Populism in Europe, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Forum Berlin, pp.11-25.  
Ludvig, A., (September 2004), “Why Should Austria be Different from Germany? The Two 
Recent Nationality Reforms in Contrast”, German Politics, Vol.13, No.3, pp. 499-515. 
Minkenberg, M., (2011), “The Radical Right in Europe Today: Trends and Patterns in East 
and West”. In: N. Langenbacher & B. Schellenberg (eds.), Is Europe on the ‘Right’ 
Path?: Right-wing Extremism and Right-wing Populism in Europe,Friedrich Ebert 
Stiftung, Forum Berlin, pp.37-56. 
Mudde, C., (2014), “The Far-Right and the European Elections”, Retrieved at October 19 
2014: http://www.unitedagainstracism.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Cas-    
           Mudde-Euro-elections-2014_CH-article.pdf 
Mudde, C., (2013), “The 2012 Stein Rokkan Lecture: Three Decades of Populist Radical     
Right Parties in Western Europe: So What?”, European Journal of Political Research, 
Vol. 52, pp.1-19. 
Mudde, C., (May 2012), “The Relationship between Immigration and Nativism in Europe 
and North America”, Migration Policy Institute, Washington, pp.1-32. 
Mudde, C., (2007), Populist Radical Right Parties, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Mudde, C., (1999), “The Single-issue Party Thesis: Extreme Right Parties and the 
Immigration Issue”, West European Politics, Vol. 22, No.3, pp. 182-197. 
Nedelcu, H. & C. Miller, (2011), “Migration and the Extreme Right in Western Europe”, 
Review of European and Russian Affairs, Vol.6, No.1, pp. 55-64. 
Norris, P., (2005), Radical Right: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge. 
Party Programme of the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), (2011), www.fpoe.at, Retrieved at 
February 12, 2012. 
Party Programme of National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD), (2010), Retrieved at 
February 16, 2012, http://www.npd-sh.de/index.php 
Party Programme of NPD for Europe, (2003), Retrieved at May 18, 2012, 
http://www.partyprogrammeofnpdforeurope.pdf 
Poggioli, S., (2006), “Anti-immigrant Policy Boosts France’s Le Pen Again”, NPR-Morning 
Edition, Retrieved at March 7, 2012, 
www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=6522463  
Schellenberg, B., (2011), The Radical Right in Germany: Its Prohibition and Reinvention. 
In: N. Langenbacher & B. Schellenberg (eds.) Is Europe on the “Right” Path?: Right-
 106                                                  THE RISE OF FAR-RIGHT IN EUROPEAN POLITICS 
 
wing Extremism and Right-wing Populism in Europe, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Forum 
Berlin, pp. 57-82. 
Schmied, M. & W. Wieshaider, (2004), Islam and the European Union: The Austrian Way. 
In: R. Potz & W. Wieshaider (eds.), Islam and the European Union, Peeters, Leuven, 
pp.199-217. 
Schori Liang, C., (2007), Europe for the Europeans: The Foreign and Security Policy of the 
Populist Radical Right. In: C. Schori Liang (ed.), Europe for the Europeans: The 
Foreign and Security Policy of the Populist Radical Right, Ashgate, London, pp.1-32. 
Schulz, M., (2011), Combating Right-wing Extremism as a Task for European Policy 
Making. In N. Langenbacher and B. Schellenberg (eds.), Is Europe on the “Right” 
Path?: Right-wing Extremism and Right-wing Populism in Europe, Friedrich Ebert 
Stiftung,Forum Berlin, pp. 27-36. 
Strasser, S., (2008), “Europe’s Other: Nationalism,Ttransnationals and Contested Images of 
Turkey in Austria”, European Societies Vol.10, No.2, pp.177-195. 
Vasilopoulou, S., (2011), “European Integration and the Radical Right: Three Patterns of 
Opposition”, Government and Opposition, Vol.46, No.2, pp. 223-244. 
Williams, M. H., (2010), “Can Leopards Change Their Spots? Between Xenophobia and 
Trans-ethnic Populism among West European Far Right Parties”, Nationalism and 
Ethnic Politics, Vol. 16, pp. 111-134. 
Williams, M. H., (2006), The Impact of Radical Right-Wing Parties in West European 
Democracies,Palgrave Macmillan, New York. 
Wilson, R. & P. Hainsworth, (2012), “Far-right Parties and Discourse in Europe: A 
Challenge for Our Times”, Report of European Network Against Racism, Brussels, 
pp.1-28. 
Zuquete, J. P., (October 2008), “The European Extreme-right and Islam: New Directions?”, 
Journal of Political Ideologies Vol.13, No.3, pp. 321-344. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
